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1 Introduction
One of the hardest problems in the foundations of physics is the problem of the arrows
of time. If the dynamical laws are (essentially) time-symmetric, what explains the
irreversible phenomena in our experiences, such as the melting of ice cubes, the decaying
of apples, and the mixing of cream in coffee? Macroscopic systems display an entropy
gradient in their temporal evolutions: their thermodynamic entropy is lower in the
past and higher in the future. But why does entropy have this temporally asymmetric
tendency? Following Goldstein (2001), let us distinguish between the two parts of the
problem of irreversibility:
1. The Easy Part: if a system is not at maximum entropy, why should its entropy
tend to be larger at a later time?
2. The Hard Part: why should there be an arrow of time in our universe that is
governed by fundamental reversible dynamical laws?
The Easy Part was studied by Boltzmann (1964)[1896]. Crucial to Boltzmann’s answer
is this:
• Key to the Easy Part: states of larger entropy occupy much larger volume in the
system’s phase space than those states of lower entropy.
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So far, answering the Easy Part does not require any time-asymmetric postulates.1
Boltzmann’s program is primarily focused on closed subsytems of the universe. But
its success leads us to expect that a Boltzmannian account can work at the universal
level. If we model the universe as a mechanical system, we expect that typically, the
non-equilibrium state of the universe will evolve towards higher entropy at later times.
However, why is the entropy lower in the past? That is the Hard Part. A proposed
answer suggests that it has to do with the initial condition of the universe:
• Key to the Hard Part: the universe had a special beginning.
We can introduce this as an explicitly time-asymmetric postulate in the theory, by using
the Past Hypothesis:
Past Hypothesis (PH) At the initial time of the universe, the microstate of the universe
is in a low-entropy macrostate.2
Given that some microstates are anti-entropic, it is standard to introduce a probability
distribution over the microstates compatible with the low-entropy macrostate:
Statistical Postulate (SP) The probability distribution of the initial microstate of the
universe is given by the uniform one (according to the natural measure) that is
supported on the macrostate of the universe.
However, a detailed probability distribution may be unnecessary. In the typicality
framework, we just need to be committed to a typicality measure:
Typicality Postulate (TP) The initial microstate of the universe is typical inside the
macrostate of the universe.3
Unlike SP, TP is compatible with a variety of measures that agree on what is typical.
PH, SP, and TP are physical postulates that have an empirical status. The answer to the
Hard Part of the problem of irreversibility requires PH and either SP or TP. In fact, we
also need to assume (an unconditionalized) notion of probability or typicality to answer
the Easy Part. I call the answers to the Easy Part and the Hard Part the Boltzmannian
account of the arrow of time.
How to characterize the initial macrostate of PH remains an open question. We
know that the matter distribution is more or less uniform in the early universe, which
is contrary to the usual conception of low entropy. However, the initial gravitational
1Boltzmann’s Stosszahlansatz (hypothesis of molecular chaos) is often blamed for introducing an illicit
time asymmetry. But it is an innocent theoretical postulate if we understand it correctly—as a typicality
or probability measure over initial conditions. See (Goldstein et al. 2020, section 5.5).
2The Past Hypothesis was originally suggested in (Boltzmann 1964)[1896] (although he seems to favor
another postulate that can be called the Fluctuation Hypothesis) and discussed in (Feynman 2017)[1965].
For recent discussions, see (Albert 2000), (Goldstein 2001), (Callender 2004, 2011), (Lebowitz 2008), (North
2011), (Loewer 2020), and (Goldstein et al. 2020). The memorable phrase ‘Past Hypothesis’ was coined
by Albert (2000).
3For more on the notion of typicality and its application in statistical mechanics, see (Goldstein 2012),
(Lazarovici & Reichert 2015), and (Wilhelm 2019).
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degrees of freedom are in a special state, providing a sense that the total state of the early
universe has low entropy. This observation led Penrose (1979) to postulate a geometric
version of PH called the Weyl Curvature Hypothesis: the Weyl curvature vanishes at
the initial singularity. The urgent question is, of course, how to understand this in
terms of quantum theory or quantum gravity. Some steps have been taken in the Loop
Quantum Cosmology framework by Ashtekar & Gupt (2016). This is compatible with a
Boltzmannian account, but the final details will depend on the exact theory of quantum
gravity, which is currently absent.
In the philosophical literature, a number of objections have been raised against the
Boltzmannian account. First, some criticize the answer to the Easy Part: the explanation
is too hand-wavy and not completely rigorous (Frigg 2007). Second, some criticize the
answer to the Hard Part, such as that PH is not even false because the entropy of the
early universe is not well-defined (Earman 2006), or that PH is not sufficient to explain
the thermodynamic behaviors of subsystems (Winsberg 2004), or that it is ad hoc, and
therefore, not explanatory (Price 2004; Carroll 2010, p.346). These are responses in the
literature, and more work on these issues is certainly welcome. However, my interest
here is different. I take the Boltzmannian account as a starting point. My aim is to
explore the conceptual and scientific ramifications of accepting PH and its explanation
of time’s arrow.
In this paper, I focus on the connection between PH and our concept of fundamental
laws of nature. What is the status of PH if the Boltzmannian program turns out to be
successful? Can PH be accepted as a candidate fundamental law even though it is a
boundary condition of the universe? What differences does it make to our concepts
of laws, chances, and possibilities? Can PH be completely expressed in mathematical
language? What is the relevance of quantum theory to these issues? I argue for the
following theses:
Nomic Status The Past Hypothesis is a candidate fundamental law of nature.4
Axiomatic Status The Past Hypothesis is a candidate axiom of the fundamental physical
theory.5
Relevance Whether the Past Hypothesis has nomic status (and/or axiomatic status) is
relevant to the success of explaining time’s arrows, the metaphysical account of
laws, the nature of objective probability, and the mathematical expressibility of
fundamental physical theory.
Some of these ideas have been defended along Humean lines, but I think we
should accept them regardless of whether we think fundamental laws supervene on
matter distribution or are part of the fundamental facts of the world. It turns out they
4A candidate fundamental law of nature has all it takes to be a fundamental law of nature, but it may
not turn out to be the true law of the actual world if it makes false predictions. For example, Newton’s
dynamical law F = ma is a candidate fundamental law of nature but it is not the actual fundamental law.
5The status of a candidate fundamental law of nature and the status of a candidate axiom of the
fundamental physical theory may be equivalent. I distinguish the two theses because some people may
be happy to accept one but deny the other. They may be reluctant to call PH a fundamental law, perhaps
due to it being a boundary condition.
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are acceptable even on certain non-Humean frameworks.6 My methodology below
is naturalistic and functionalist. Whatever plays the role of a fundamental law can be a
fundamental law. Whatever that cannot be derived from more fundamental laws and
plays the right roles in guiding our inferences about the past and the future, underlying
various scientific explanations, high-level regularities, our manifest image of influence
and control, and so on, is a candidate fundamental law.7 To borrow a phrase from
Loewer (2020), PH “looks, walks and talks” like a fundamental law. So, we should
interpret it as such. Hence, I disagree with people who think that even if PH is true
and plays all the roles we suggest, it still cannot be a fundamental law—it may just be
a special but contingent initial condition. I also disagree with people who think that
whether or not PH is a fundamental law makes no substantive differences.8
Here is the roadmap. In §2, I provide more details of the Boltzmannian account and
discuss the modifications to PH when we move from classical mechanics to quantum
mechanics. The variations result in three types of physical theories: the Classical
Mentaculus, the Quantum Mentaculus, and the Wentaculus theories. In §3, I provide
positive arguments for the nomic and axiomatic statuses of PH. Some of these have
been mentioned in the literature, but it is worth emphasizing and clarifying the exact
argumentative structure. I also put forward a novel argument based on considerations
about the nature of the quantum state. In §4, I discuss some apparent obstacles from
recognizing PH as a fundamental law. This has to do with its nature as a boundary
condition, the status of the Statistical Postulate and the Typicality Postulate, and the
intrinsic vagueness in their specifications. I argue that these worries do not have much
force even on some non-Humean views, and they become even less worrisome in the
Wentaculus theory.
2 Variations on a Theme from Boltzmann
Before we get into the philosophical and conceptual issues, let us be more explicit about
what the Boltzmannian account is and how to state PH in that account. Although the
Boltzmannian account is more or less the same in classical and in quantum theories, the
exact form of PH is subtly different. I will exploit this difference in §4 to dissolve some
of the worries about the classical version of PH. Readers familiar with the standard
Boltzmannian statistical mechanics can jump to §2.3, where a new framework called
the Wentaculus is introduced.
6This view is, I think, in the same spirit as the suggestion made by Demarest (2019).
7I do not claim that we should reduce laws to these roles; that would be the strategy of metaphysical
functionalism about laws. Rather, I am merely appealing to the methodology in naturalistic metaphysics
of science that I think many people accept independently of the issue of the arrows of time.
8Maudlin (2007) §4 seems to regard PH as an important boundary condition but does not think of
it as a fundamental law. The disagreement is based on a different view about how laws govern that I
call Dynamical Law Primitivism, which I discuss in §3.4. Carroll (2010) (p.345) suggests that there is no
substantive difference between the statements “the early universe had a low entropy” and “it is a law of
physics that the early universe had a low entropy.” Carroll seems to be worried about the distinction
between boundary conditions and laws; I discuss this in §4.1.
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2.1 The Classical Mentaculus
Let us start with the Boltzmannian account in classical statistical mechanics and
summarize its basic elements from the “individualistic viewpoint.”9 Let us consider a
classical-mechanical system with N particles in a box of volume Λ = [0,L]3 ⊂ R3 and a
Hamiltonian H = H(X) = H(q1, ...,qN;p1, ...,pn) that specifies the standard interactions
in accord with Newtonian gravitation, Coulomb’s law, and other forces obeyed by the
classical system.
1. Microstate: at any time t, the microstate of the system is given by a point in a
6N-dimensional phase space,
X = (q1, ...,qN ;p1, ...,pn) ∈ Γtotal ⊆ R6N, (1)
where Γtotal is the total phase space of the system.
2. Dynamics: the time dependence of Xt = (q1(t), ...,qN(t);p1(t), ...,pn(t)) is given by
the Hamiltonian equations of motion:
dqi(t)
dt
= ∂H
∂pi
,
dpi(t)
dt
= −∂H
∂qi
. (2)
3. Energy shell: the physically relevant part of the total phase space is the energy
shell Γ ⊆ Γtotal defined as:
Γ = {X ∈ Γtotal ∶ E ≤ H(x) ≤ E + δE}. (3)
We only consider microstates in Γ.
4. Measure: the measure µV is the standard Lebesgue measure on phase space,
which is the volume measure on R6N. The Lebesgue measure on a finite volume
can be normalized to yield a probability distribution.
5. Macrostate: with a choice of macro-variables, the energy shell Γ can be partitioned
into macrostates Γν:
Γ =⋃
ν
Γν. (4)
A macrostate is composed of microstates that share similar macroscopic features
(i.e., similar values of the macro-variables), such as volume, density, and pressure.
Caveat: the partition of microstates into macrostates is exact only after we
stipulate some choices of the parameters for coarse-graining (the size of the cells)
and correspondence (between functions on phase space and thermodynamic
quantities). We call these C-parameters. Without exact choices of the C-parameters,
the partition is inexact and the boundaries between macrostates are vague.10
9I follow the discussion in (Goldstein & Tumulka 2011). These do not intend to be rigorous
axiomatizations of classical statistical mechanics. What is presented here differs in emphasis from (Chen
2018), as here I am explicit about the sources of vagueness, which will be discussed in §4.
10For more discussions, see (Chen 2020b).
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(a) Vague boundaries (b) Exact boundaries
Figure 1: The partition of microstates into macrostates on phase space: (a) without exact
choices of the C-parameters, (b) with exact choices of the C-parameters. X0 represents
the actual microstate of the universe at t0. M0 represents the vague boundaries of the
PH macrostate. Γ0 represents an admissible precisification of M0, where Γ′0 represents
another admissible precisification. The diagrams are not drawn to scale.
See Figure 1. It is also expected that given the nature of the actual forces, some
partitions will be superior to others in supporting generalizations in the special
sciences.
6. Unique correspondence: given exact choices of the C-parameters, the macrostates
partition the energy shell, and as a consequence, every phase point X belongs to
one and only one Γν. (This point is implied by #5. But I make it explicit to better
contrast it with the situation in quantum statistical mechanics.)
7. Thermal equilibrium: typically, there is a dominant macrostate Γeq that has almost
the entire volume with respect to µV:
µV(Γeq)
µV(Γ) ≈ 1. (5)
A system is in thermal equilibrium if its phase point X ∈ Γeq.
8. Boltzmann Entropy: the Boltzmann entropy of a classical-mechanical system in
microstate X is given by:
SB(X) = kBlog(µV(Γ(X))), (6)
where Γ(X) denotes the macrostate containing X. The thermal equilibrium state
thus has maximum entropy.
Caveat: Without exact values of the C-parameters, there will be many admissible
choices of the Γ(X)’s. Moreover, what is admissible is also vague. Since kB is a
scaling constant that plays no direct dynamical role, its value is also vague. Hence,
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the Boltzmann entropy of a microstate should be understood as a vague quantity.
If we stipulate some C-parameters and the value of kB, we can arrive at an exact
boundary for the macrostate that contains X and an exact value of Boltzmann
entropy for the system.
9. Low-Entropy Initial Condition: on the assumption that we can model the universe
as a classical-mechanical system of N point particles, we postulate a special
low-entropy boundary condition, which Albert (2000) calls the Past Hypothesis
(PH):
Xt0 ∈ ΓPH , µV(ΓPH) ≪ µV(Γeq) ≈ µV(Γ), (7)
where ΓPH is the PH macrostate with a volume much smaller than that of the
equilibrium macrostate. Hence, SB(Xt0), the Boltzmann entropy of the microstate
at the boundary, is very small compared to that of thermal equilibrium. Here, ΓPH
is underspecified; we can add further details to specify the macroscopic profile
(temperature, pressure, volume, density) of ΓPH.
The answer to the Easy Part of the problem of irreversibility lies in the first eight
bullet points, which make plausible the hypothesis of the typical tendency for a
system to evolve to higher entropy towards the future. Even though microstates
are “created equal,” macrostates are not. Their volumes are disproportionate and
uneven. Macrostates with higher entropy have much larger volume in the energy shell.
Furthermore, the largest macrostate is by far that of thermal equilibrium. It is plausible
that, unless the dynamics are extremely contrived, a typical microstate starting from a
medium-entropy macrostate will find its way through larger and larger macrostates
and eventually arrive at thermal equilibrium. That is a process in which a system’s
entropy gradually increases until it reaches the entropy maximum.11 Of course, for the
actual universe, there can be exceptions to the entropy increase, such as short-lived
fluctuations in which entropy decreases.
However, this solves only half the problem. If typical microstates compatible with
a medium-entropy macrostate will, at most times, increase in entropy towards the
future, then typical micorstates compatible with the same macrostate will also, at most
times, increase in entropy towards the past. Hence, given the resources so far, we have
shown that the medium-entropy macrostate is overwhelmingly likely at an entropy
minimum produced by a thermodynamic fluctuation from equilibrium. We are led to
the Hard Part of the problem: why is the entropy so much lower in the past direction of
time? Enter the Past Hypothesis. Given PH, the actual microstate starts in an atypical
region of the energy shell, in a low-entropy macrostate M0. Suppose we choose a
precisification Γ0. Given the Easy Part, typical initial microstates compatible with Γ0
will evolve towards macrostates of higher entropy in the future direction. But there is
nothing earlier than t0, as it is stipulated to be the initial time—say, the time of the Big
11Boltzmann’s original H-theorem (Boltzmann 1964)[1896] is an attempt to show this. Lanford (1975)
produces an exact result for a simple system of hard spheres where the Boltzmann equation is shown
to be satisfied for a short duration of time, and hence, Boltzmann entropy is shown to be increasing
towards the future. However, it is plausible that the equation continues to be valid and Boltzmann
entropy continues to rise afterwards.
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Bang.12
Therefore, if we find the universe to be in a medium-entropy macrostate Γt, say the
state we are in right now, then the actual microstate is not like a typical microstate
inside Γt, but a special one that is compatible with Γ0. The reason that the entropy was
lower in the past is because the universe started in a special macrostate, a state of very
low Boltzmann entropy. Assuming PH, it is reasonable to expect with overwhelming
probability that entropy will be higher in the future and was lower in the past, and the
sense of probability is specified by bullet point #4. There are two ways to understand
the measure:
• A measure of probability: the natural measure picks out the correct probability
measure of the initial condition. This interpretation yields the Statistical Postulate.
• A measure of typicality: the natural measure is a simple representer of a vague
“collection” of measures that are equivalent as the measure of typicality of the
initial condition. This interpretation yields the Typicality Postulate.
PH together with the Statistical Postulate supports the following classical-mechanical
version of the Second Law of Thermodynamics (this is adapted from the Mathematical
Second Law described in (Goldstein et al. 2020) §5.2):
The Second Law for X At t0, the actual phase point of the universe X0 starts in a
low-entropy macrostate and, with overwhelming probability, it evolves towards
macrostates of increasingly higher entropy until it reaches thermal equilibrium,
except possibly for entropy decreases that are infrequent, shallow, and short-lived;
once Xt reaches Γeq, it stays there for an extraordinarily long time, except possible
for infrequent, shallow, and short-lived entropy decreases.
The Second Law can be stated also in the language of typicality. For simplicity, I will
conduct the discussion below mostly in the language of probability.
The Second Law above is stated for the behavior of the universe, but it also makes
plausible what Goldstein et al. (2020) call a ‘development conjecture’ about isolated
subsystems in the universe:
Development Conjecture Given PH, an isolated system that, at a time t before thermal
equilibrium of the universe, has macrostate ν appears macroscopically in the
future, but not the past, of t like a system that at time t is in a typical microstate
compatible with ν.
Classical mechanics with just the fundamental dynamical laws (expressed in equa-
tions (2)) are time-symmetric. Introducing the probability measure takes care of the Easy
Part of the problem of irreversibility, but to solve the Hard Part of the problem—the
retrodiction to the past, we need to explicitly introduce something that breaks the time
symmetry. PH is a simple postulate that does the job. The bullet points about energy
12It can also be stipulated that t0 is some time close to the Big Bang, in which case some anti-
thermodynamic behavior can be displayed in the short duration before t0.
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shell, macrostate partition, unique correspondence, and the dominance of thermal equi-
librium are supposed to follow from the basic postulates about fundamental dynamics
(including the structure of the Hamiltonian function) and the probability measure.
Adapting the terminology of Albert (2015) and Loewer (2020), we call the collection of
basic postulates the Classical Mentaculus:
The Classical Mentaculus
1. Fundamental Dynamical Laws (FDL): the classical microstate of the uni-
verse is represented by a point in phase space that obeys the Hamiltonian
equations of motion described in equations (2).
2. The Past Hypothesis (PH): at a temporal boundary of the universe, the
microstate of the universe lies inside M0, a low-entropy macrostate that,
given a choice of C-parameters, corresponds to Γ0, a small-volume set of
points on phase space that are macroscopically similar.
3. The Statistical Postulate (SP): given the macrostate M0, we postulate a
uniform probability distribution (with respect to the standard Lebesgue
measure) over the microstates compatible with M0.
This account therefore assigns probability 1 to the initial macrostate. If the probability
distribution is given a status of objective probability, it delivers more than just the Second
Law. It provides an exact probability for any proposition formulable in the language
of phase space. This is the reason that Albert and Loewer regard the Mentaculus as
providing a “probability map of the world.” Hence, the Mentaculus has an ambitious
scope: it is possible to recover all the non-fundamental regularities, including the
special science laws (such as laws of economics), and other arrows of time such as the
epistemic arrow, the records arrow, the influence arrow, and the counterfactual arrow.
Whether the Albert-Loewer project can succeed in their ambitious goal of recovering
all the non-fundamental regularities and arrows of time is an interesting question.
Nonetheless, the Classical Mentaculus as formulated provides an underpinning for
the thermodynamic arrow of time. Given the universality and importance of the
Second Law, the Mentaculus should be taken as a serious contender for a promising
framework of the structure of a fundamental physical theory. In the next subsection,
I examine how to adapt the Classical Mentaculus to the quantum domain. In §3, I
discuss the suggestion that PH should be taken as a candidate fundamental law and
some ramifications of the more ambitious project.
2.2 The Quantum Mentaculus
Let us turn to the Boltzmannian account of quantum statistical mechanics from the
“individualist viewpoint.” Consider a quantum-mechanical system with N fermions
(with N > 1020) in a box Λ = [0,L]3 ⊂ R3 and a Hamiltonian Hˆ. (Here, I follow the
discussions in (Goldstein et al. 2010a) and (Goldstein & Tumulka 2011).)
1. Microstate: at any time t, the microstate of the system is given by a normalized
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(and anti-symmetrized) wave function:
ψ(q1, ...,qN) ∈Htotal = L2(ΛN,Ck) , ∥ ψ ∥L2= 1, (8)
whereHtotal = L2(ΛN,Ck) is the total Hilbert space of the system.
2. Dynamics: the time dependence of ψ(q1, ...,qN; t) is given by the Schrödinger
equation:
ih̵
∂ψ
∂t
= Hˆψ. (9)
3. Energy shell: the physically relevant part of the total Hilbert space is the subspace
(“the energy shell”):
H ⊆Htotal ,H = span{φα ∶ Eα ∈ [E,E + δE]}, (10)
This is the subspace (of the total Hilbert space) spanned by energy eigenstates φα
whose eigenvalues Eα belong to the [E,E + δE] range. Let D = dimH , the number
of energy levels between E and E + δE.
We only consider wave functions ψ inH .
4. Measure: given a subspaceH , the measure µS is the surface area measure on the
unit sphere in that subspaceS (H ).13
5. Macrostate: with a choice of macro-variables,14 the energy shell H can be
orthogonally decomposed into macro-spaces (subspaces):
H = ⊕νHν , ∑
ν
dimHν = D (11)
EachHν corresponds to small ranges of values of macro-variables that are chosen
in advance.
Caveat: similarly to the classical case, the decomposition of Hilbert space into
macrostates requires some stipulation of the exact values of the C-parameters.
But in the quantum case, these parameters includes coarse-graining sizes, cor-
respondences of functions, and also the cut-off values of how much support a
quantum state needs to be inside a subspace to be counted towards belonging
to the macrostate (see the next bullet point). Without the exact choices of the
C-parameters, the decomposition is inexact and it is vague which microstate
belongs to which macrostate. Again, it is also expected that given the nature of
the actual forces, some decompositions will be superior to others for supporting
generalizations in the special sciences.
13For simplicity, let us assume that the subspaces we deal with are finite-dimensional. In cases
where the Hilbert space is infinite-dimensional, it is an open and challenging technical question. For
example, we could use Gaussian measures in infinite-dimensional spaces, but we no longer have uniform
probability distributions.
14For technical reasons, Von Neumann (1955) suggests that we round up these macro-variables
(represented by quantum observables) so as to make the observables commute. See (Goldstein et al.
2010b, section 2.2) for a discussion of von Neumann’s ideas.
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6. Non-unique correspondence: typically, a wave function is in a superposition of
macrostates and is not entirely in any one of the macrostates (even if we represent
macrostates with exact subspaces). However, we can make sense of situations
where ψ is (in the Hilbert space norm) very close to a macrostateHν:
⟨ψ∣Pν ∣ψ⟩ ≈ 1, (12)
where Pν is the projection operator onto Hν. This means that ∣ψ⟩ lies almost
entirely inHν. In this case, we say that ∣ψ⟩ is in macrostate ν.
7. Thermal equilibrium: typically, there is a dominant macrostate Heq that has a
dimension that is almost equal to D:
dimHeq
dimH
≈ 1. (13)
A system with wave function ψ is in equilibrium if the wave function ψ is very
close toHeq in the sense of (12): ⟨ψ∣Peq ∣ψ⟩ ≈ 1.
8. Boltzmann Entropy: the Boltzmann entropy of a quantum-mechanical system
with wave function ψ that is in macrostate ν is given by:
SB(ψ) = kBlog(dimHν), (14)
whereHν denotes the subspace containing almost all of ψ in the sense of (12). The
thermal equilibrium state thus has the maximum entropy:
SB(eq) = kBlog(dimHeq) ≈ kBlog(D), (15)
where eq denotes the equilibrium macrostate.
9. Low-Entropy Initial Condition: on the assumption that we can model the universe
as a quantum-mechanical system, let us postulate a special low-entropy boundary
condition on the universal wave function—the quantum-mechanical version of
PH:
Ψ(t0) ∈HPH , dimHPH ≪ dimHeq ≈ dimH (16)
whereHPH is the PH macro-space with dimension much smaller than that of the
equilibrium macro-space.15 Hence, the initial state has very low entropy in the
sense of (25). More details can be added to narrow down the range of choices of
HPH.
The quantum Boltzmannian account is similar to the classical one. The higher-
entropy macrostates have much higher dimensions than lower-entropy ones, and the
equilibrium macrostate has by far the largest dimension. It is plausible that, unless
the dynamics is very contrived, a medium-entropy wave function will find its way
15Again, we assume thatHPH is finite-dimensional, in which case we can use the surface area measure
on the unit sphere as the typicality measure for # 10. It remains an open question in QSM about how to
formulate the low-entropy initial condition when the initial macro-space is infinite-dimensional.
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through larger and larger subspaces and eventually arrive at the equilibrium subspace.
Again, if typical wave functions in non-equilibrium macrostates evolve towards higher
entropy in the future, then typical ones also come from higher entropy states in the
past. The quantum mechanical Past Hypothesis blocks that inference. The reason
there is a thermodynamic arrow in a quantum universe is because the universal wave
function started in a special state, a subspace with very low entropy (the one described
by the quantum PH). Assuming the quantum PH, it is reasonable to expect that with
overwhelming probability the entropy is higher in the future and lower in the past, with
the probability measure specified in bullet point #4. Again, we can understand it as a
measure of probability or a measure of typicality.
Together, the probability distribution and PH support the quantum-mechanical
version of the Second Law:
The Second Law for Ψ At t0, the actual wave function of the universe Ψ0 starts in a
low-entropy macrostate, and with overwhelming probability, it evolves towards
macrostates of increasingly higher entropy until it reaches thermal equilibrium,
except possibly for entropy decreases that are infrequent, shallow, and short-lived;
once Ψt reachesHeq, it stays there for an extraordinarily long time, except possibly
for infrequent, shallow, and short-lived entropy decreases.
(This makes plausible a similar Development Conjecture for typical isolated subsystems.)
Note again we stipulate three basic postulates in the quantum version of the
Boltzmannian account: the fundamental dynamical laws, PH, and SP. Let us call this
the Quantum Mentaculus:
The Quantum Mentaculus
1. Fundamental Dynamical Laws (FDL): the quantum microstate of the uni-
verse is represented by a wave function Ψ that obeys the Schrödinger
equation (9).
2. The Past Hypothesis (PH): at a temporal boundary of the universe, the
wave function Ψ0 of the universe lies inside a low-entropy macrostate that,
given a choice of C-parameters, corresponds to HPH, a low-dimensional
subspace of the total Hilbert space.
3. The Statistical Postulate (SP): given the subspace HPH, we postulate a
uniform probability distribution (with respect to the surface area measure
on the unit sphere ofHPH) over the wave functions compatible withHPH.
The Quantum Mentaculus, as a candidate fundamental theory of physics, faces
the quantum measurement problem. To solve the measurement problem, there are
three promising options: Everettian quantum mechanics, Bohmian mechanics, and
GRW spontaneous collapse theories. We have three distinct kinds of the Quantum
Mentaculus.
First, the Everettian version is completely the same as the original Quantum
Mentaculus in terms of the basic postulates. However, it diverges greatly from common
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sense: we have to give up the expectation that experimental outcomes are unique and
determinate. Instead, our experiences are to be understood as experiences of agents in
an emergent multiverse (Wallace 2012).
Second, the Bohmian version posits that in addition to the wave function, which
evolves unitarily according to the Schrödinger equation, particles have precise locations,
and their configuration Q = (Q1,Q2, ...,QN) follows the guidance equation, which is an
additional law in the theory:
dQi
dt
= h̵
mi
Im
∇iψ(q)
ψ(q) (q = Q) (17)
Moreover, the initial particle distribution is given by the quantum equilibrium distribu-
tion:
ρt0(q) = ∣ψ(q, t0)∣2 (18)
Adding the above two postulates to the Quantum Mentaculus completes the Bohmian
Mentaculus.
Third, the GRW version requires revisions to the linear evolution represented by the
Schrödinger equation. The wave function typically obeys the Schrödinger equation,
but the linear evolution is interrupted randomly (with rate Nλ, where N is the number
of particles and λ is a new constant of nature of order 10−15 s−1) by collapses:
ΨT+ = Λk(X)1/2ΨT−∣∣Λk(X)1/2ΨT− ∣∣ , (19)
where ΨT− is the pre-collapse wave function, ΨT+ is the post-collapse wave func-
tion, the collapse center X is chosen randomly with probability distribution ρ(x) =∣∣Λk(x)1/2ΨT− ∣∣2dx, k ∈ {1,2, ...N} is chosen randomly with uniform distribution on that
set of particle labels, and the collapse rate operator is defined as:
Λk(x) = 1(2piσ2)3/2 e− (Qk−x)22σ2 , (20)
where Qk is the position operator of “particle” k, and σ is another new constant of
nature of order 10−7 m postulated in current GRW theories. The GRW Mentaculus
replaces the deterministic Schrödinger evolution of the wave function by this stochastic
process. It still requires PH. However, as Albert (2000) §7 points out, it is plausible
(though not proven) that SP is no longer needed, and the GRW collapses suffice to make
anti-entropic trajectories unlikely (through the quantum probabilities stipulated by the
GRW stochastic process). (See Ismael’s contribution in this volume.)
2.3 The Wentaculus
In this subsection, let us consider the Boltzmannian account of quantum statistical
mechanics with a very special “fundamental density matrix.” This account is inspired
by (Dürr et al. 2005), proposed in (Chen 2018), and discussed at length in (Chen 2019a,
2020d). It is another variation on the same theme from Boltzmann, but it suggests some
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astonishing possibilities, one of which is the Initial Projection Hypothesis that will be
introduced shortly.
The density matrix can play the same dynamical role as the wave function does in
the previous theories. In a quantum system represented by a density matrix W, W is
the complete characterization of the quantum state; it does not necessarily refer to a
statistical state representing our ignorance of the underlying wave function. In general,
W can be a pure state or a mixed state. A density matrix Wˆ is pure if Wˆ = ∣ψ⟩ ⟨ψ∣ for
some ∣ψ⟩. Otherwise it is mixed. For a spinless N-particle quantum system, a density
matrix of the system is a positive, bounded, self-adjoint operator Wˆ ∶H →H with
trWˆ = 1, whereH is the Hilbert space of the system. In terms of the configuration space
R3N, the density matrix can be viewed as a function W ∶ R3N ×R3N → C. In the unitary
case, Wˆ always evolves deterministically according to the von Neumann equation:
ih̵
dWˆ(t)
dt
= [Hˆ, Wˆ]. (21)
Equivalently:
ih̵
∂W(q, q′, t)
∂t
= HˆqW(q, q′, t) − Hˆq′W(q, q′, t), (22)
where Hˆq means that the Hamiltonian Hˆ acts on the variable q. The von Neumann
equation generalizes the Schrödinger equation (9).
Importantly, now the “fundamental” quantum state can be either pure or mixed.
Even when it is mixed, there is no underlying pure state that is more basic. The mixed
state is completely objective. This perspective, called Density Matrix Realism, is in sharp
contrast to the prevalent view called Wave Function Realism. In the density-matrix
realist framework, we need to modify the Boltzmannian quantum statistical mechanics
described in the earlier section. Here are the key changes:
• Microstate: at any time t, the microstate of the system is given by a density matrix
Wˆ(t) that can be pure or mixed. (Macrostates are still represented by orthogonal
subspaces of the energy shell.)
• Dynamics: in the unitary case, the density matrix Wˆ(t) evolves according to the
von Neumann equation (21).
• Being in a macrostate: typically, a density matrix is a superposition of macrostates
and is not entirely in any one of the macrospaces. However, we can make sense of
situations where Wˆ(t) is very close to a macrostateHν:
tr(Wˆ(t)Iν) ≈ 1, (23)
where Iν is the projection operator ontoHν. This means that almost all of Wˆ(t) is
inHν. In this situation, we say that Wˆ(t) is in macrostateHν.
• Thermal equilibrium: typically, there is a dominant macro-spaceHeq that has a
dimension that is almost equal to D:
dimHeq
dimH
≈ 1. (24)
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A system with density matrix Wˆ(t) is in equilibrium if Wˆ(t) is very close toHeq in
the sense of (23): tr(Wˆ(t)Ieq) ≈ 1.
• Boltzmann entropy: the Boltzmann entropy of a quantum-mechanical system
with density matrix Wˆ(t) that is very close to a macrostate ν is given by:
SB(Wˆ(t)) = kBlog(dimHν), (25)
for which W is in macrostateHν in the sense of (23).
Next, let us consider how to adapt PH in a density-matrix realist framework. The
wave-function version of PH says that every initial wave function is entirely contained
in the PH subspaceHPH. Similarly, for density-matrix theories, we can propose that
every initial density matrix is entirely contained in the PH subspace:
tr(Wˆ(t0)IPH) = 1 , dimHPH ≪ dimHeq ≈ dimH (26)
where IPH is the projection operator onto the PH subspace. Assuming HPH is finite-
dimensional, there is also a natural probability distribution over all density matrices
inside this subspace. See (Chen & Tumulka 2020) for a mathematical characterization.
The probability distribution and the density-matrix Past Hypothesis support a Second
Law for W, which is similar to the Second Law for Ψ.
However, there is an even more natural way to implement the idea of PH in the
density-matrix framework, which I favor. PH picks out a particular subspaceHPH. It
is canonically associated with its projection IPH. In matrix form, it can be represented
as a block-diagonal matrix that has a k × k identity block, with k = dimHPH, and zero
everywhere else. There is a natural density matrix associated with IPH, namely the
normalized projection IPHdimHPH . Hence, we have picked out the natural density matrix
associated with the PH subspace. I propose that the initial density matrix is the
normalized projection ontoHPH:
WˆIPH(t0) = IPHdimHPH . (27)
I call this postulate the Initial Projection Hypothesis (IPH) in (Chen 2018). Crucially, it
is different from (16) and (26); while IPH picks out a unique quantum state given PH,
the other two permit infinitely many possible quantum states inside the PH subspace.
Remarkably, we no longer need a fundamental postulate about probability or typicality
for the quantum state. We know that we can decompose a density matrix non-uniquely
into a probability-weighted average of pure states, and in the canonical way we can
decompose WˆIPH(t0) as an integral of pure states on the unit sphere ofHPH with respect
to the uniform probability distribution:
WˆIPH(t0) = ∫
S (HPH) µ(dψ) ∣ψ⟩ ⟨ψ∣ . (28)
The decomposition here is not an intrinsic expression of what WˆIPH(t0) is, as witnessed
by the non-uniqueness. But the expression is something that can nonetheless be used
fruitfully in statistical analysis (Chen 2020d, section 3.2.3).
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By doing away with the need for an extra postulate about initial quantum states, we
only need two basic postulates. I call the theory the Wentaculus:
The Wentaculus
1. Fundamental Dynamical Laws (FDL): the quantum state of the universe is
represented by a density matrix Wˆ(t) that obeys the von Neumann equation
(21).
2. The Initial Projection Hypothesis (IPH): at a temporal boundary of the
universe, the density matrix is the normalized projection ontoHPH, a low-
dimensional subspace of the total Hilbert space. (That is, the initial quantum
state of the universe is WˆIPH(t0) as described in equation (27).)
Similar to the Quantum Mentaculus, the Wentaculus also suffers from the quantum
measurement problem. There are three promising solutions, each of which gives rise to
a distinct version of the Wentaculus.
First, there is the Everettian Wentaculus that looks exactly like the basic Wentaculus.
For this theory, we need to embrace the idea that there is a (vague) multiplicity of
emergent worlds that is similar to the original Everettian theory. What is interesting
about the Everettian Wentaculus is that it suggests an astonishing possibility. If IPH is
interpreted as a fundamental law, then the theory is strongly deterministic, in the sense
of (Penrose 1989) that the laws pick out a unique micro-history of the fundamental
ontology (represented by W(t)). This theory does not postulate any objective probability.
This is another step towards the Everettian aspiration of constructing a theory without
any fundamental contingency.
Second, the Bohmian Wentaculus postulates that, in addition to the universal density
matrix W that evolves unitarily according to the von Neumann equation, there are
actual particles that have precise locations in physical space, represented by R3. The
particle configuration Q = (Q1,Q2, ...,QN) ∈ R3N follows the guidance equation (written
for the i-th particle):16
dQi
dt
= h̵
mi
Im
∇qiW(q, q′, t)
W(q, q′, t) (q = q′ = Q), (29)
Moreover, the initial particle distribution is given by the density-matrix version of the
quantum equilibrium distribution:
P(Q(t0) ∈ dq) = W(q, q, t0)dq. (30)
Third, the GRW Wentaculus postulates that the universal density matrix typically
obeys the von Neumann equation, but the linear evolution is interrupted randomly by
collapses (with rate Nλ, where N is the number of particles and λ is a new constant of
16This version of the guidance equation is first proposed by Bell (1980), then recast as the dynamical
equation for the fundamental density matrix in Dürr et al. (2005).
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nature of order 10−15 s−1):17
WT+ = Λk(X)1/2WT−Λk(X)1/2tr(WT−Λk(X)) , (31)
where WT− is the pre-collapse density matrix, WT+ is the post-collapse density matrix,
with k uniformly distributed in the N-element set of particle labels and X distributed by
ρ(x) = tr(WT−Λk(x)), with the collapse rate operator defined as before in (20).
In this section, we presented several versions of PH. They can all be traced back to
the original Boltzmannian idea that the initial state of the universe is special and has
low entropy. Differences arise when we move to the Wentaculus framework where IPH
selects a unique and simple initial microstate of the universe. The microstate is given by
a mixed-state density matrix. The reason a mixed state can play the role of a microstate
is because it enters directly into the fundamental dynamical equations, such as (21),
(29), and (31). The different initial-condition postulates—(7), (16), and (26)—form a
family, and I shall continue using the generic label, the “Past Hypothesis,” to refer to
them and will only use specific labels when their differences are relevant.
3 Why the Past Hypothesis is Law-Like
It is clear that PH has a special status in the Boltzmannian account. It has been suggested
that PH is like a law of nature. For example, this is emphasized by Feynman (2017)[1965]
as quoted in the epigraph. Making a similar point about classical statistical mechanics,
Goldstein et al. (2020) suggests that PH is an interesting kind of law:
The past hypothesis is the one crucial assumption we make in addition
to the dynamical laws of classical mechanics. The past hypothesis may well
have the status of a law of physics—not a dynamical law but a law selecting
a set of admissible histories among the solutions of the dynamical laws.
In this section, I offer four types of positive arguments to support the view that PH
is a candidate fundamental law of nature. These arguments also support the weaker
thesis that PH is a candidate axiom in the fundamental theory. My methodology is
naturalistic and functionalist. I argue for the Nomic Status of PH by locating the roles
of the fundamental laws in our physical theories and by showing that PH plays such
roles. These roles include backing scientific explanations, constraining nomological
possibilities, and supporting objective probabilities.
Some of these arguments (§3.1–3.3) are related to ideas that have appeared in the
literature. I try to make the premises explicit, with the hope that the arguments are
clear enough for others who disagree to examine and criticize. Usually, the arguments
are made in the Humean framework, but as I argue, they can also be made on behalf of
non-Humeans who have a minimalist conception of what it is for laws to really govern.
That is the account I favor. Of course, the minimalist account is at odds with the idea
about “dynamical governing”:
17To my knowledge, the W-GRW equations first appear in (Allori et al. 2013).
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Dynamical Governing Only dynamical laws can be fundamental laws of nature.
In §3.4, I offer a new argument for the Nomic Status of PH based on considerations of
the nature of quantum entanglement.
3.1 Arguments from the Second Law
The (fundamental) nomic status of PH is supported by the nomic status of the Second
Law of Thermodynamics. The Second Law is a law of nature; whatever underlies a law
is a law. A law that cannot be derived from other laws is a fundamental law; therefore,
PH is a fundamental law. Let us spell out the argument in more detail:
P1 The Second Law of Thermodynamics is a law of nature.
P2 A law of nature can be scientifically explained only by appealing to more funda-
mental laws of nature and laws of mathematics.
P3 The Second Law of Thermodynamics is scientifically explained (in part) by PH, and
PH is not a law of mathematics.
C1 So, PH is a law of nature and is more fundamental than the Second Law.
P4 PH is not scientifically explained by fundamental laws.
P5 A law of nature that is not scientifically explained by fundamental laws is a
fundamental law.
C2 So, PH is a fundamental law of nature.
Comments on P1. First, the Second Law of Thermodynamics summarizes an
important regularity: the tendency for things to become more chaotic and more decayed
as time passes. It is part of our concept of lawhood that this irreversible tendency
is law-like. We learn about this law much more directly in our experiences than the
microscopic equations of motion. Second, nature’s irreversible tendency is encoded in
our concept of physical necessity. For example, we learn that it is physically impossible
for a metal rod to spontaneously heat up on one side and then cool down on the other;
it is physically impossible to create a perpetual motion machine of the second kind (a
machine that violates the Second Law), and this is impossible no matter who tries to do
it – whenever and wherever.18 Hence, the Second Law is not an accidental feature of
the world. Of course, the usual formulation of the Second Law in terms of the absolute
monotonic increase of entropy is too strong. It should be modified in two ways: it holds
for the overwhelming majority of nomologically possible initial conditions, and for
each entropic trajectory, there can be short-lived, shallow, and infrequent decreases of
entropy (see Second Laws for X and for Ψ).
Recognizing the importance of the Second Law, Eddington (1928) suggests:
18This becomes more complicated if an “Albertian demon” turns out to be physically possible. See
(Albert, 2000, §5) and Maudlin’s contribution in this volume.
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If someone points out to you that your pet theory of the universe is
in disagreement with Maxwell’s equations—then so much the worse for
Maxwell’s equations. If it is found to be contradicted by observation—well,
these experimentalists do bungle things sometimes. But if your theory is
found to be against the second law of thermodynamics I can give you no
hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation.
That may be too strong. Nevertheless, we should accept that the Second Law is
nomologically necessary. It is not merely an accidental feature of the world, such as
the contingent fact that all gold spheres are less than one mile in diameter. Third,
counterfactuals are backed by laws of nature; laws are what we hold fixed when
evaluating counterfactuals. The Second Law backs counterfactuals about macroscopic
processes that display a temporal asymmetry: if there were a half-mixed ink drop in my
water cup right now, it would have been more separated in the past and more evenly
mixed in the future. (See §3.2 for more on the counterfactual arrow.)
Comments on P2. The notion of scientific explanation here is not a fully analyzed
notion. What is relevant to this argument is that the Second Law is supposed to be
derived as a theorem from the basic postulates of the Mentaculus or the Wentaculus. It is
expected that, assuming the laws of mathematics, the fundamental dynamical laws, PH,
and SP, an initial microstate starting from the initial macrostate will, with overwhelming
probability, travel to macrostates of increasingly higher entropy until it reaches thermal
equilibrium (except possibly for short-lived and infrequent decreases of entropy). So, it
is the Second Law’s mathematical derivation from the basic postulates of the physical
theory that is the relevant notion here.19
A standard response to P2 is that a non-fundamental law (such as those in the special
sciences) can be explained (in part) by some contingent boundary conditions. Examples
may include the laws of genetics and laws of economics. However, it is not clear what
does the explanatory work in those cases. Let us suppose that some special science law
S arise from boundary conditions B. Suppose B obtains. Then there is a high objective
probability that S obtains. What is the origin of these objective probabilities? What is
the physical explanation? If everything is ultimately physical, and the physical theory
is informationally complete in so far as the motion of objects go, then it seems that
the objective probabilities are ultimately backed by some postulates in physics. The
probabilities in physics may supply conditional probabilities on which Pr(S∣B) is high.
What does the explaining, then, is the probability supplied by physics, and the real
law should be the high probability of S obtaining given B, which is consistent with the
physicalist picture we started with.
Winsberg (this volume) offers another potential counterexample to P2. He suggests
that due to the near certainty of the existence of Boltzmann brains and large fluctuations
in future epochs of the universe, it is important to postulate also a Near Past Hypothesis
(see also (Chen 2020c)):
Near Past Hypothesis (NPH) We are inside the first epoch of the universe between the
19This is different from the notion of metaphysical explanation. See (Loewer 2012), (Hicks & van Elswyk
2015). On their views, a fundamental law of nature is metaphysically explained (but not scientifically
explained) by the matter distribution.
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initial time and the first relaxation to thermal equilibrium.
Winsberg argues that NPH should have the same status as PH and SP because it is also
a necessary postulate to derive the Second Law (among other special science laws).
However, NPH is an indexical statement about our location in time; as such, it cannot
be a candidate fundamental law of nature. So if a non-law can be part of the explanation
for the Second Law, then there is no reason to think that only laws can back laws. This
is an interesting insight, but I do not think Winsberg’s argument undermines P2. If
indexical statements cannot be laws, then the Second Law should not be stated in an
indexical way. We should use the non-indexical version of the Second Law (and special
science laws), such as the Second Law for X, the Second Law for Ψ, and the Second Law
for W. In those versions, fluctuations are already taken into account (in a non-indexical
way). Hence, we do not need to invoke NPH to derive those versions of the Second
Law from PH, SP, and the dynamical laws.
Comments on P3. This premise is true if we grant the explanatory success of the
Boltzmannian account, which is assumed in this paper. It is clear that PH is not a law of
mathematics.
Comments on P4. P4 is an open scientific question. Perhaps some future theory
(e.g. along the lines of (Carroll & Chen 2004)) can explain PH using some simple and
satisfactory dynamical laws. Still, it is also a scientific possibility that PH remains a
fundamental law in the final theory and is not explained further. Given the openness
of P4, we should accept C2 only to the degree of acknowledging PH as a candidate
fundamental law.
Comments on P5. This follows from our concept of a fundamental law of nature.
The argument above supports the (fundamental) nomic status of PH. If Nomic
Status implies Axiomatic Status, then the argument also supports the idea that PH is an
axiom in the fundamental physical theory. But there is another, more straightforward
argument for the Axiomatic Status. The predictive consequences of a physical theory
should come entirely from its axioms and their deductive consequences. A good
physical theory aims at capturing as many regularities as possible using simple axioms.
The Second Law describes an important regularity. Therefore, we postulate PH and SP
in addition to the fundamental dynamical laws. These postulates have an axiomatic
status in the Mentaculus.
The Mentaculus is a good theory; it is better than “Mentaculus-,” the Mentaculus
minus PH and SP. The Mentaculus predicts not only the motion of planets, but also
the overwhelming probability that my table will not spontaneously rearrange itself
into the shape of a statue. The Mentaculus- can tell us everything about the motion of
planets but is silent about many macroscopic regularities we see around us. Even so, the
Mentaculus is a pretty simple theory. Someone might suggest that to achieve maximal
predictive power, we can add a statement about the exact microstate of the universe at
t0 as an additional axiom to Mentaculus-. But the exact microstate is a detailed fact that
complicates the Mentaculus - such that its axioms will no longer be simple enough. (In
the Wentaculus, IPH pins down a quantum microstate, but its informational content
and simplicity level are the same as those of PH in the Mentaculus.)
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3.2 Arguments from Other Asymmetries
The thermodynamic arrow of time described by the Second Law is best explained by
PH. That provides strong support for the Nomic Status and the Axiomatic Status of
PH. What about other arrows of time? In this subsection, I present arguments based on
the counterfactual arrow, the records arrow, the epistemic arrow, and the intervention
arrow. The upshot is that they can also be traced back to the nomic status of PH, without
which they would be left completely mysterious. Many of these ideas can be found
in (Albert 2000, 2012) and (Loewer 2007), and they are also discussed in (Frisch 2005,
2007), (Demarest 2019), (Fernandes, this volume), (Callender 2004), (Horwich 1987),
and (Reichenbach 1956).
The records arrow. We have photographs and videos of WWII but no photographs of
the next major world war. We have detailed accounts of the life of President Washington
but no detailed accounts of the life of the 65th president of the United States. There are
craters on the moon indicating past meteorite impacts but no craters indicating future
meteorite impacts. Similarly, there are fossils, rocks, ice sheets, all of which tell us the
state of our planet in the past, but we do not have similarly abundant records that tell
us the state of our planet in the future.
What is it about our world such that there are abundant records of the past but few,
if any, records about the future? One could appeal to some A-theory of time, according
to which the future does not yet exist and the past has already happened. So there
cannot be records about the future because there are no facts about the future. But
this does not seem to provide a satisfactory scientific explanation, as the temporally
asymmetric probabilistic correlations have to be accepted as brute facts. In any case,
in a block-universe picture compatible with a B-theory of time, the past, present, and
future are all equally real; all events exist tenselessly. There are strong probabilistic
correlations between physical records (e.g. fossils) that exist at a particular time and
physical systems (e.g. dinosaurs) that exist at an earlier time, but no strong correlations
between physical records and events at a later time.20
PH offers an explanation. Albert (2000) suggests that a record is a relation between
two temporal ends of a physical process. A record enables us to infer what happens
inside the temporal interval. For example, in a lab, the record of an electron passing
through a small slit is the relation between the "ready state" of the measuring instrument
at t1 and the "click" state of the measuring instrument at t2. If the instrument moves
from "ready" to "click," then we can infer that an electron has passed through the slit
between t1 and t2. But if the instrument was not at "ready" at t1, we cannot infer that.
However, to know that the instrument was indeed "ready," we also need to rely on
an earlier record. This seems to go back in time ad infinitum, to records about the lab,
and to records about the larger environment, and eventually to records about earlier
states of the universe. To know that the cosmic microwave background (CMB) data is
reliable, we also need to postulate that there is some "ready" state at the beginning of the
universe. PH, stipulated at (or around) t0, is the "mother of all ready states." It provides
20The notions of “earlier” and “later” here can be fleshed out in a way that does not refer to an intrinsic
arrow of time. What matters here is not there are facts about earlier times or later times but simply that
the probabilistic correlations are temporally asymmetric.
22
the underpinning necessary for our inferences based on records to be carried out.21
However, it is not enough that PH be true. We also need to justify the important fact
that physical records are reliable. For this, we need PH to have the status of a law. (If
PH is not derived from other laws, it will have the status of a fundamental law.) If a
theory predicts that it is unlikely for physical systems that look like records to reliably
indicate past events, then the theory would undermine the rational justification for
believing in it. Such a theory would be epistemically self-undermining because we believe
in physical theories based on records about past experiments and observations.22 The
Mentaculus without PH is such a theory. It would predict that most "records" come
about from random fluctuations. If we dig out a shoe of Napoleon, most likely it came
about from random fluctuations and not from a low-entropy, past state. Postulating PH
as a law avoids that. The uniform probability distribution conditionalized on PH will
predict that most physical systems that look like "records" will be reliable records about
the past (here we set aside the problems of large future fluctuations).
The epistemic arrow. Given some information about the present, there is some sense
in which our knowledge about the past is more vast, detailed, and easily gained than
our knowledge about the future. We know that the sun will (likely) rise tomorrow, but
we do not know who will win the US presidential election of 2028 and when exactly
the stock market will crash over the next 20 years. But we know exactly who won
the election of 1860, when exactly the stock market crashed in the last 20 years, and
so on. Similar to the records arrow, the epistemic arrow is especially puzzling in a
block-universe picture compatible with a B-theory of time. All facts about the past,
present, and future are out there. Why is our knowledge so skewed towards one
temporal direction?
Albert (2000) explains the epistemic arrow in terms of the records arrow, which in turn
is explained by the Nomic Status of PH. The basic idea is this. We distinguish between
inferences based on records from inferences based on predictions or retrodictions.
The latter uses only the current macrostate together with the dynamical laws plus SP
(construed as an unconditionalized uniform probability distribution on the energy shell
of phase space) to the past (retrodictions) and to the future (predictions). Inferences
based on predictions will tell us that with overwhelming probability, the sun will rise
tomorrow and the ice cubes in my coffee will melt in the next hour, but inferences based
on retrodictions will get most things wrong about the past. For example, retrodictions
will tell us that the ice cubes in my coffee were actually smaller in the past (they
spontaneously got larger in my coffee), and all the books about someone named Lincoln
winning the 1860 election came about from random collisions of particles. However,
inferences based on records are much more powerful and demand much less detailed
information about the current macrostate of the world. We can infer to past states
reliably by assuming that records are reliable. Such an inference is backed by the
assumption that the recording device was "ready" at a time before the event, and there
was another recording device measuring the "ready" state of that one, and so on. As
21More details are needed to fully explain the records asymmetry; Rovelli (2020) provides an interesting
analysis that adds additional constraints on the initial condition.
22This is somewhat parallel to the situation of empirical adequacy and records in Everettian quantum
mechanics. See (Barrett 1996) on the latter.
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discussed before, the records arrow is explained by PH. Moreover, if the epistemic
arrow has physical necessity (or high objective probability), as is required to avoid
epistemic self-undermining, whatever underlies it also has physical necessity. In a way
similar to the records arrow, the epistemic arrow has to be non-accidental, otherwise
our beliefs about past experiments would have a low probability of being accurate.
The counterfactual arrow. I am at home right now. If I had been in my office, the
future would be somewhat different but the past would have been pretty much the
same. Trump did not press the nuclear button on Independence Day this year. If he
had, events on Labor Day would be dramatically different but events on Memorial
Day would have been pretty much the same. Why is there a temporal asymmetry of
counterfactual dependence? The semantics for counterfactuals is a controversial issue.
It is not clear if there is a unified theory that explains every instance of counterfactuals
in ordinary language. But if we focus on the counterfactuals that are important for
control, decision, and action, it is often accepted that such counterfactuals are backed by
laws. This is made explicit in Lewis (1979)’s metric for comparing similarity relations
among worlds, but it should also be compatible with a strict-conditional approach.
If the laws are temporally asymmetric, and if laws entail that changes in the present
macrostate would lead to vast differences in the future but not much in the past, then
the counterfactual arrow has an explanation.
However, given equations (2) in classical mechanics or equations (9, 17) in unitary
quantum mechanics, changes to the current state (such as the location of Trump’s index
finger and the location of the nuclear button) will lead to macroscopic differences in both
directions of time. It is only by assuming PH as a fundamental law can we explain the
following: most physically possible trajectories compatible with the current macrostate
will be such that if Trump had pressed the button, most future trajectories would be
macroscopically different from the actual ones but the past trajectories would be pretty
much the same. This is also due to the records arrow. Assuming PH, there will be an
abundance of records about the past. In so far as PH makes it very likely that those
records are reliable, PH constrains the past histories of the trajectories even if certain
macroscopic features get changed in the present state. However, few, if any, records
exist about the future, so there is no such constraint on future macrostates.
The correct counterfactual semantics will no doubt involve context sensitivity and
other parameters. Still, it is hard to deny that laws of nature play an important role in
determining the truth values of counterfactuals.
The intervention arrow. We can exert influence towards future events but we can
no longer act to bring about changes to the past. The intervention arrow is intimately
connected to the counterfactual arrow, and it is not clear which is conceptually prior.
Some contemporary analyses of influence and intervention are couched in the causal
modeling framework. In that framework, we have directed acyclic graphs with
variables representing events and arrows representing the direction of effect. But if the
fundamental dynamical laws are time-symmetric, what is the scientific explanation
for these arrows? Often, the arrows are taken to be primitives in the causal model,
left unexplained. However, if PH explains the counterfactual arrow, then it can also
explain the arrow of intervention. We can flesh out the language of intervention in
terms of intervention counterfactuals, and the arrow of intervention counterfactuals
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can be explained in a similar way by the records arrow and PH. Loewer (2007) provides
such an account.
The arguments from the entropic arrow (the Second Law) and the other arrows can
be taken together as an inference to the best explanation. PH (and SP) ground these
asymmetries of time. Moreover, to explain them satisfactorily, we need to postulate PH
as a fundamental law and we need SP to provide objective probabilities. An opponent
may take all of these arrows to be fundamental features of the world, and they can
postulate them as primitives in the theory. But that would strike many as a fragmented
and unsatisfactory view. Postulating PH and SP in addition to the dynamical laws is a
much simpler and more unified way to think about the various arrows of time: from a
set of simple axioms, we can derive all of the temporally asymmetric regularities—we
get a big bang for the buck.
3.3 Arguments from Metaphysical Accounts of Laws
Humeanism provides a natural home for PH to be a fundamental law and for SP
to specify objective probabilities. According to Lewis (1983), the fundamental laws
and postulates of objective probabilities are the axioms of the best system that are true
about the mosaic and optimally balances various theoretical virtues such as simplicity,
informativeness, and fit. On this account, the dynamical equations such as equations (2,
9, and 17) could be axioms of their respective best systems and the GRW chances could
be the objective probabilities in a GRW world. Can the classical Mentaculus, quantum
Mentaculus, and the Wentaculus count as axiomatizations of the best system? This
depends on whether PH can count as a fundamental Lewisian law and whether SP can
count as objective probabilities on the best-system account. Anticipating the need to
add a boundary condition into the best system, Lewis (1983) writes,
A law is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system. (Or, in
case of ties, in every ideal system.) The ideal system need not consist entirely
of regularities; particular facts may gain entry if they contribute enough
to collective simplicity and strength. (For instance, certain particular facts
about the Big Bang might be strong candidates.) But only the regularities of
the system are to count as laws. (p.367)
But if a statement such as PH is axiomatic in the best system, why not count it towards
laws? In the same paper (p. 368), Lewis distinguishes between fundamental laws and
derived laws. He suggests that fundamental laws are those statements that the ideal
system takes as axiomatic and invokes only perfectly natural properties. But PH certainly
is axiomatic in the Mentaculus and the Wentaculus. Moreover, PH can be stated in the
fundamental language of the respective theory. (There will be some residual vagueness,
which we discuss in §4.3.) So it seems that Lewis should be open to the idea that PH is
a fundamental law according to the best-system account.23
Hence, if we are committed to the Humean conception that laws supervene on
the mosaic in the way specified by the best-system account, we are led to accept the
23For a related point, see (Callender 2004).
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fundamental nomic status of PH. (Similarly, as Loewer (2001) argues, Lewis’s version of
Humeanism also has room to recognize the probabilities specified by SP as objective.)
On the Humean theory, given facts about the mosaic, the theoretical virtues meta-
physically determine what the laws are. They are constitutive of laws. Laws are just
certain ideal summaries of facts in the world. Laws are nothing over and above the
mosaic.
On non-Humean theories, however, laws do not supervene on the mosaic. Laws
may be as fundamental as the mosaic itself. Following Hildebrand (2013), we can
distinguish between two types of non-Humean theories:
1. Primitivism: fundamental laws are primitive facts in the world.
2. Reductionism: fundamental laws are analyzed in terms of something outside the
mosaic.
Carroll (1994) and Maudlin (2007) maintain primitivist versions of non-Humeanism.
Hildebrand (2013) provides a survey of the reductionist versions according to which
laws are further explained by relations among universals, dispositions, essences, or
some other more fundamental entities. It is not clear what the further analysis buys us.
It is not clear to me how to reformulate various modern physical laws and objective
probabilities in terms of those entities, and it is less clear to me what advantages there
are to reduce laws to something further.24 Here I agree with Maudlin that the concept of
laws seems more familiar to us than the concepts employed in the further analysis (such
as in terms of dispositions, universals, and the like). Maudlin’s version of primitivism
is influential in contemporary discussions of the metaphysics of laws in philosophy of
physics. However, Maudlin (2007) favors a more restrictive version of primitivism that
I call Dynamical Law Primitivism:
Dynamical Law Primitivism Fundamental laws are primitive facts in the world, and
only dynamical laws can be fundamental laws.
This view is connected to Maudlin’s view about the intrinsic and primitive arrow of
time. In contrast, the spirit of the present project is to analyze time’s arrow in terms of
something else. In fact, the extra commitment about the primitive arrow of time can be
disentangled from the basic idea about how laws govern.
The basic non-Humean idea is simply that laws really govern. They metaphysically
explain why the nomological possibilities are the way they are and why things are as
constrained as they are. The metaphysical explanation can take the form of constraints:
given S(t0), some complete specification of the state of the universe at some time, there
is a constraint on what the history of the world is like. If the theory is deterministic,
then there is only one microscopic history compatible with the S(t0). A fundamental
dynamical law is a kind of conditional constraint. Constraints can take other forms,
such as by selecting a space of possible histories. This is the form of certain equations
in general relativity and Maxwellian electrodynamics. It is also true of PH, as it selects
24Hildebrand (2013) suggests that reductionist theories have an advantage over primitivist theories for
answering the problem of induction. I disagree, but I set it aside for future work.
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“a set of admissible histories among the solutions of the dynamical laws.” There is
conceptual space for a minimalist conception of primitivism that places no restriction
on the form of fundamental laws and in particular, not all of them have to be dynamical
laws. The basic view is this:
Minimal Primitivism Fundamental laws are primitive facts in the world; there is no
restriction on the form of fundamental laws. In particular, boundary conditions
can be fundamental laws.
Even though fundamental laws can take on any form, we expect them to be relatively
simple and informative. These theoretical virtues are no longer constitutive of what
laws are, but they can serve as our best guides to find the primitive laws25:
Epistemic Guides Even though theoretical virtues such as simplicity and informative-
ness are not constitutive of fundamental laws, they are good epistemic guides for
discovering the fundamental laws.
Chen & Goldstein (2020) develop this idea in more detail. It seems to me that
Minimal Primitivism is a good version of non-Humeanism, and it may well be one
that best fits our scientific practice and the actual conception of laws. The minimal
primitivist view does not commit to an intrinsic and irreducible arrow of time, making
it compatible with the Boltzmannian project of analyzing time’s arrow in terms of the
entropy gradient. PH, as we have discussed already, is virtuous in the right ways.
It provides a simple explanation for the restrictions of physical possibilities and the
overwhelming probability of irreversibility. According to the Epistemic Guides on the
Minimal Primitivist conception, we have found strong evidence that PH is a candidate
fundamental law.
Hence, both Humeanism and non-Humeanism (in the minimalist form) support the
idea that PH is a candidate fundamental law.
3.4 New Light on Quantum Entanglement
I suggest that there is a new reason to take PH as a fundamental law: it can help us solve
a long-standing puzzle in the foundations of quantum mechanics. One of the chief
innovations of quantum theory that has no classical analog is quantum entanglement.
It is also the origin of the quantum measurement problem. If we solve the measurement
problem using one of the three strategies discussed in §2: along the lines of Everett,
Bohm, and GRW, we are still left with the quantum state that plays an important
dynamical role in the respective theories. Hence, the puzzle of quantum entanglement
can be traced to the nature of the quantum state. What does the quantum state represent
physically? What is it in the world? Given the role of Ψ in formulating well-posed
initial-value problems in EQM and BM, and its role in dynamical collapses in GRW, it is
reasonable to think that Ψ represents something objective. Here are some options for a
realist interpretation (see (Chen 2019b) for more detail):
25Why is this expectation rational? I do not know of any non-circular justification. We can appeal to
the success of physics and the discovery of simple and informative laws in the past. We may also appeal
to a deeper “meta-law” that metaphysically constrain the physical laws.
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1. High-dimensional field: on this view, the fundamental space is isomorphic to
the 3N-dimensional configuration space; the wave function represents a physical
field on that space (Albert 1996). Even the defenders acknowledge that this view
has highly counter-intuitive consequences. It is also an open question whether it
really succeeds in recovering the manifest image of lower-dimensional objects.
2. Low-dimensional multi-field: on this view, the fundamental space is the physical
space(time); the wave function represents a “multi-field” that assigns physical
quantities to every spatial region composed of N points (Forrest 1988, Belot 2012,
Chen 2017, Hubert & Romano 2018). However, this view also appears to have
undesirable consequences. In the multi-field interpretation of Everettianism, since
entanglement relations are still in the 4-dimensional mosaic, its Lorentz-invariance
comes at a surprising cost—the failure of what Albert (2015) calls narratability.
This also arises in Wallace & Timpson (2010)’s spacetime state realist interpretation
of Everett. For the Bohmian framework, the multi-field guides particles, but there
is no influence (back-reaction) of the particles on the multi-field, even though both
the particles and the multi-field are fundamental material entities.
3. Nomological interpretation: on this view, the fundamental space is the physical
space(time) and the fundamental ontology consists in particles, fields, or flashes on
that space; the wave function represents a physical law (Dürr et al. 1996), (Goldstein
& Teufel 2001) and (Goldstein & Zanghì 2013). Given the problems of the other
two approaches, the nomological interpretation remains a promising solution.
However, it faces problems of a different kind. First, Ψt is time-dependent.
Can nomological entities change in time? I do not see why not. Moreover, as
defenders of this view have long recognized, if the universal quantum state obeys
the Wheeler-DeWitt equation HΨ = 0 then Ψ will be time-independent and not
changing. Second, the universal wave function is a very detailed function and
may be too complicated to be a law. This problem seems much more serious. Call
this the problem of complexity.
Taking PH to be a fundamental law provides a solution to the problem of complexity
in the nomological interpretation of the quantum state. This solution works in the
Wentaculus framework, where IPH is given a fundamental nomic status. For IPH, the
normalized projection ontoHPH contains no more and no less information thanHPH,
specified by PH in the Mentaculus. If HPH is simple and informative enough to be
nomological, then so is its normalized projection, which is WIPH(q, q′, t0). That is, we
can afford the same status of a fundamental law to WIPH(q, q′, t0). In the Everettian
Wentaculus, we can interpret WIPH(q, q′, t0) as a law that determines the “local beables,”
such as a matter-density field in physical space. In the Bohmian Wentaculus, we
can interpret WIPH(q, q′, t0) as similar to the Hamiltonian function H(p, q): providing
a velocity field of particle trajectories. In the GRW Wentaculus, we can interpret
WIPH(q, q′, t0) as providing conditional probabilities for the configurations of“local
beables,” such as a matter-density field or flashes in spacetime.
However, to solve the complexity problem, it is not sufficient for IPH to be a
contingent initial condition; it is crucial that IPH has the status of a fundamental law.
If it is nomologically possible for W0 to differ from the state specified by IPH, then
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the initial quantum state could well be (i.e. physically possible) too complicated to be
regarded as nomological. Hence, only by assuming the nomic status of IPH do we
obtain a solution to the problem of complexity, thereby arriving at a satisfactory way to
understand the nature of the quantum state. In contrast to the first two interpretations
according to which quantum entanglement relations are in the material ontology, the
nomological interpretation of the quantum state locates the origin of entanglement
in the laws. And by taking a nomological interpretation of the quantum state in the
Wentaculus framework, we see a unified solution to two problems in the foundations
of physics: the problem of irreversibility and the nature of the quantum state. Again,
this is compatible with both Humeanism and (the minimal form of) non-Humeanism
about laws. (For more detail, see (Chen 2018, 2020a).)
4 Apparent Conflicts with Our Concept of Laws of Nature
In the previous section, I have provided positive arguments for the fundamental, nomic
status of PH. In this section, I discuss three apparent conflicts between these arguments
and the ordinary conceptions of laws of nature. These apparent conflicts may explain
some people’s hesitation in accepting the fundamental, nomic status of PH. However,
as I argue, these conflicts are merely apparent if we adopt the Mentaculus framework,
and at any rate, they become even less worrisome in the Wentaculus framework.
4.1 Boundary Condition Laws?
It is often said that PH is merely a boundary condition. The contrast between boundary
conditions and fundamental laws can be seen in the differences between the paradigm
cases of dynamical laws—such as equations (2, 9, 17, 21, and 29), and boundary
conditions that select subclasses of the dynamically possible trajectories. Boundary
conditions do not directly play a dynamical role.
It is not clear how to make this worry precise. First, it is unclear why every
law has to be dynamical. Second, by restricting the possible initial conditions, a
boundary-condition law can be an important ingredient in the theory, as in the case of
the Mentaculus. In fact, in the Wentaculus framework, the boundary condition IPH
plays a direct dynamical role, akin to the dynamical role of the Hamiltonian function in
classical mechanics. For example, in the Bohmian version, IPH (27), the von Neuman
equation (21), and the guidance equation (29) can be combined into one equation:
dQi
dt
= h̵
mi
Im
∇qiWIPH(q, q′, t)
WIPH(q, q′, t) (Q) = h̵mi Im∇qi ⟨q∣ e−iHˆt/h̵WˆIPH(t0)eiHˆt/h̵ ∣q′⟩⟨q∣ e−iHˆt/h̵WˆIPH(t0)eiHˆt/h̵ ∣q′⟩ (q = q′ = Q) (32)
Hence, in the Bohmian version, IPH does not just select a subclass of velocity fields; it
pins down a unique velocity field. In the Everettian version, IPH does not just select a
subclass of possible multiverses; it pins down a unique one. In the GRW version, IPH
is directly involved in setting the chances of collapses.
There is a related worry about admitting boundary condition laws. Typically we
distinguish between dynamical laws and initial conditions. If initial conditions can
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be laws, then how can we distinguish between laws and contingent data? It seems
that the distinction would collapse. However, that is not the case. Some boundary
conditions such as PH have the elite status as fundamental laws, but it does not follow
that all boundary conditions are similarly elite. This is because not all boundary
conditions exemplify the optimal balance of required theoretical virtues (either as
constitutive of what laws are or as epistemic guides to primitive laws), including
simplicity, informativeness, and fit.
One may worry that it is odd to have a fundamental law that refers to a particular
time (t0). Our most familiar fundamental laws are general statements that do not refer to
a particular time or place. But why is it a requirement that laws cannot refer to particular
events? Suppose some places or times are in fact physically distinguished; then it seems
appropriate for laws to refer to them. Think about the Aristotelian tendency for things
to move towards the center of the (geocentric) universe. If that is indeed the case, then
we should have a fundamental law describing that motion, and a simple candidate
would just be to state that the center of the world, C0, is the place towards which things
evolve. Similarly, if the initial time, t0, is indeed special (as the initial state accounts for
a great many regularities), then it is appropriate to postulate a law that refers to t0.
4.2 Non-Dynamical Chances?
Another worry concerns the nature of objective probabilities. The Mentaculus postulates
both PH and SP. PH and SP share the explanatory burden, so they should have the
same status. It is important that the probabilities of SP be objective. However, if the
dynamics are deterministic (as in the Bohmian and the Everettian versions), objective
probabilities seem to be either 0 or 1. How can non-trivial probabilities be objective
and represent something beyond subjective credences? (In so far as typicality plays a
similar explanatory role as probability, TP may face the same prima facie problem as SP.)
Humeanism has the resources to solve this problem. Loewer (2001) suggests that de-
terministic “chances” can gain entry in the Lewisian best system by the informativeness
they bring and the simplicity of the postulate, such as the uniform measure specified
by SP. On non-Humeanism, how to understand deterministic “chances” is an open
problem. On Minimal Primitivism, perhaps the notion of primitive constraining (of
the initial state) can come in degrees that can be represented by probabilities. Another
way to allow deterministic “chances" is to use the notion of typicality specified by TP,
which can be interpreted as only allowing the initial conditions that are typical. On
this understanding, abnormal, anti-entropic initial conditions are not nomologically
possible. (A similar problem arises in Bohmian mechanics, which requires a quantum
equilibrium distribution in addition to the deterministic dynamical laws, to deduce the
usual Born rule for subsystems.)
In the Wentaculus framework, it is clear that there is an objective anchor for SP
(and TP). Since IPH selects a unique initial quantum state of the universe, we no longer
need a probability distribution over initial quantum states. However, as a purely
mathematical fact, the WIPH(t0) induces a “uniform” probability distribution over pure
states. This is not a fundamental postulate of probability in the theory, unlike SP
or TP in the Mentaculus. It arises as a mathematical consequence of the objective
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quantum microstate of the universe. This emergent probability distribution, though
not fundamental, can play the same role in statistical analysis about typical behaviors.
For example, the usual conjecture about typical pure states approaching equilibrium
can be translated into the following: most parts of the density matrix will be very close
to the equilibrium subspace, which is equivalent to the claim that the density matrix
will approach equilibrium. Hence, the Wentaculus framework provides an objective
anchor for SP and TP.26
4.3 Nomic Vagueness?
The final worry about the fundamental nomic status of PH has to do with the fact that
PH is vague, and an exact version of PH would be arbitrary in an unprecedented way.
In Figure 1 of §2.1, I made clear that the boundaries of macrostates are fuzzy, and the
macrostates only form an exact partition if we stipulate some arbitrary choices of the
parameters for coarse-graining. These are the C-parameters: the size of coarse-graining
cells, the exact correspondence between macroscopic quantities and functions on phase
space, and (in the quantum case) the cut-off value for macrostate inclusion. There are
better or worse ways to choose the C-parameters. But it is implausible that there are
some exact values of C-parameters as known to Nature. The vagueness comes up in
the Classical Mentaculus and the Quantum Mentaculus in how PH selects an initial
macrostate that constrains the initial microstate. In the quantum case, PH only selects
an exact subspace in Hilbert space when we choose some arbitrary C-parameters.
In the Quantum Mentaculus, can we stipulate that there is an exact subspaceHPH as
known to Nature? This leads to what I call untraceable arbitrariness. There is an infinity
of admissible changes27 to the boundary of HPH that do not change the nomological
status of most microstates compatible withHPH. This is unlike the kind of arbitrariness
of natural constants or other fundamental laws. For example, any change to the value of
the gravitational constant in Newtonian theory will make most worlds (compatible with
the original Newtonian theory) impossible. What about the case of stochastic theories?
Are the dynamical chances traceable? Yes they are, but not in the way of changing
status from physically possible to physically impossible. The traceable changes are
reflected in the probabilistic likelihood of most worlds.
I discuss this in more details in (Chen 2020b). Here I provide a simple illustration
by considering mechanisms for flipping a coin (see Figure 2(a)). Suppose we have a
stochastic coin and it is flipped three times. It landed Heads, Tails, and Heads. In the
color version of the diagram, the possible sequences are marked in black and the actual
sequence is marked in red. The simplest chance hypotheses are going to be:
• Hα: the chance of landing Heads at each flip is the same, and it is α.
26However, it does not answer the related question about the nature of the quantum equilibrium
distribution in Bohmian theories. But that is different from the issue of the status of SP and TP.
27Admissibility here is vague and rightly so. It can be interpreted as some measure of simplicity of
theories. We want PH to be simple enough, and different ways of carving out the boundary will lead to
different exact versions of PH. But we only want to consider those versions that are sufficiently simple
(and not too gerrymandered).
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Figure 2: Illustration of nomic vagueness using the contrast between a stochastic coin
and a deterministic coin. What is actually observed is this sequence: Heads, Tails,
Heads.
So, this is a one-parameter family of chance hypotheses. H0.5 is the hypothesis that
the coin is fair, H1 is the hypothesis that the coin always lands Heads, and so on.
Among these hypotheses, a sequence of coin flips will select exactly one of the chance
hypotheses from this class based on which one receives the highest likelihood value. In
this case, it is H2/3 with the highest likelihood value being 4/27. Conversely, H2/3 will
assign a determinate chance to every sequence of coin flips. If Nature stochastically
acts according to H2/3, then changing the chance of Heads even slightly, say to 0.65,
will change the chance of every sequence. So, it is in this sense that stochastic theories
are traceable. Of course, we can imagine a more gerrymandered chance hypothesis
according to which half of the time, the coin operates with a 5/6 chance of landing
Heads, and the other half of the time, the coin operates with a 3/6 chance of landing
Heads. This will predict the same chance as H2/3 to every sequence, but it is far less
simple. The gerrymandered chance hypothesis is not a serious competitor to H2/3. The
actual hypothesis is by far simpler and more fit than any competitor.
Traceability is lost in the case of the deterministic coin. In this case, there are no
dynamical transition chances. The objective probabilities come from probabilities over
initial conditions. Suppose a deterministic coin is flipped and it lands Heads, Tails, and
Heads. In the color version of Figure 2(b), the red dots represent the initial conditions of
the coin (which also include details about the flipping mechanism) that deterministically
lead to the sequence HTH, and the black dots represent initial conditions that lead to
other outcomes (such as HHH, TTT, and so on). To simplify things, suppose the sample
space is finite, so there are only finitely many initial conditions to consider. Then we
can draw different probabilistic hypotheses as different “circles” over initial conditions.
Suppose the Black Circle encloses 4 red dots and 23 black dots. Then it represents a
probabilistic hypothesis that all and only the dots within the Black Circle are possible
initial conditions and each dot has equal probability. The Black Circle has the highest
likelihood given the data of HTH. If the Green Circle encloses 4 red dots and 25 black
dots, then the Green Circle is less likely than the Black Circle given HTH. However, it is
easy to have a nearby circle, say the Blue Circle, that (like the Black Circle) has 4 red
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dots and 23 black dots. This is possible if the red dots are sufficiently localized in state
space such that it is easy to preserve their proportion to the black dots while changing
the boundary of the circle.
Moreover, specifying the Blue Circle need not be more complicated than specifying
the Black Circle. They are the same kind of probabilistic hypotheses, and there is no
reason to think that one is more gerrymandered than the other, unlike the situation
with the stochastic coin where to recover the same likelihood, one has to resort to
time-dependent chances. This reasoning can be generalized if the state space gets richer
and the sequence of coin flips gets longer. There may be infinitely many ways to slightly
change the boundary of the Black Circle and keep the relative proportions constant.
This means that there will be a large class of probabilistic hypotheses that have the
same likelihood given a particular history of coin flips. No particular hypothesis is
far simpler and more fit than all competitors. Hence, super-empirical virtues such as
simplicity will become more relevant. Furthermore, since the variation of the boundary
is incremental, comparing simplicity can generate a sorites series: is there a determinate
class of hypotheses that are simple enough? It is implausible for there to be a sharp line.
Hence, we have a vague “collection” of hypotheses that pass the simplicity bar.
The contrast between the stochastic coin and the deterministic coin is analogous to
the comparison between GRW theories and a vague law such as PH. GRW chances are
traceable, but the boundary of the PH macrostate and the exact probability distribution
are untraceable. Hence, there are reasons to think that if PH is a fundamental law in the
Mentaculus, then it is a vague law. I call this phenomenon nomic vagueness.
However, it is not clear why vagueness disqualifies a statement from being a
fundamental law. After all, we should be led by empirical evidence and scientific
practice to consider what the laws are, and our metaphysical commitments to precision
and exactness should not be given absolute priority. It is a surprising consequence
that a fundamental law can be vague. This gives us reason to think that perhaps
the final theory of the world will not be completely mathematical expressible, in so
far as vagueness and higher order vagueness defy classical logic and set-theoretic
mathematics. This is a radical consequence about nomic vagueness that deserves more
attention (Chen 2020e).
Nevertheless, the situation is different in the Wentaculus. It gets rid of nomic
vagueness without introducing untraceable arbitrariness. According to IPH, the initial
macrostate and the initial microstate is represented by the quantum state of the universe—
WIPH(t0). It enters directly into the fundamental micro-dynamics. Hence, WIPH(t0) will
be traceable from the perspective of two realist interpretations of the quantum state
(Chen 2019b):
1. WIPH(t0) is ontological: if the initial density matrix represents something in the
fundamental material ontology, IPH is obviously traceable. Any changes to the
physical values WIPH(t0) will leave a trace in every world compatible with IPH.
2. WIPH(t0) is nomological: if the initial density matrix is on a par with the fundamen-
tal laws, then WIPH(t0) plays the same role as the classical Hamiltonian function
or fundamental dynamical constant of nature. It is traceable in the Everettian
version with a matter-density ontology as the initial matter-density is obtained
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from WIPH(t0). It is similarly traceable in the GRW version with a matter-density
ontology. For the GRW version with a flash ontology, different choices of WIPH(t0)
will, in general, lead to different probabilities of possible macro-histories. In
the Bohmian version, different choices of WIPH(t0) will lead to different velocity
fields such that for typical initial particle configurations (and hence typical worlds
compatible with the theory), they will take on different trajectories.
The traceability of WIPH(t0) is due to the fact that we have connected the low-entropy
macrostate (now represented by WIPH(t0)) to the micro-dynamics (where WIPH(t0)
appears). Hence, WIPH(t0) is playing a dual role at t0 (and only at that time): it is both
the microstate and the macrostate. In contrast, the untraceability of Γ0 in classical
mechanics is due to the fact that classical equations of motion directly involve only
the microstate X0, not Γ0. Similarly,HPH in the standard wave-function formulation is
untraceable because the Schrödinger equation directly involves only the wave function,
notHPH. Many changes could be made to Γ0 andHPH that would not trickle down
whatsoever in typical worlds compatible with these postulates. The Mentaculus,
but not the Wentaculus, faces a dilemma between nomic vagueness and untraceable
arbitrariness.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that, in the Boltzmannian framework, PH is a candidate fundamental law
of nature. Such a view is supported by the theoretical roles PH plays in the theory. In
arguing for the Nomic Status and the Axiomatic Status of PH, we see that whether it is
a law makes a difference to many other issues in the foundations of physics. Moreover,
its nomic status calls for some re-thinking about the nature of physical laws. I suggest
that, according to Humeanism and a minimal version of non-Humeanism, boundary
conditions can be fundamental laws, SP and TP can be objective, and fundamental
laws and chances can be vague. The conflicts with our concept of laws of nature are
merely apparent, and in any case, they become much less worrisome if we adopt the
Wentaculus framework. Hence, the view that PH is a candidate fundamental law
should be more widely accepted than it is now.
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